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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the judgment of many public officials in Mexico
has been influenced by private interests, leading these officials
(and, consequently, the state) to make erroneous decisions in
order to maintain their preferential and privileged status above
ordinary citizens rather than serving public needs. This is not to
suggest that corruption is absent from the private or business sec-
tors, nor that corruption at both the international and the
national levels does not pose an equally serious problem for the
country.1 In fact, in some instances, private sector corruption can
actually prove far more damaging than its political/administrative
counterpart because it can go unnoticed by the general public,
whereas the public sector is more closely monitored due to the
nature of its functions.2
1. See NAPOLEON SALTOS GALARzA, ETICA Y CORRUPCION: ESTUDIo DE CASos 44
(2001) (citing Jaime Zuluaga Nieto, Cuando la Corrupci6n Invade al Tejido Social,
NUEVA SOCIEDAD (VENEZ.), Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 148-159), available at http:l
www.respondanet.com/spanishlanti-corrupcion/informes/
capitulo2_saltos-galarza.pdf (defining and detailing private corruption).
2. It cannot be forgotten that in all cases where bribery is related to government
acquisitions, a private agent will also be involved, offering, promising or granting any
benefit in return for an unwarranted advantage in his business dealings with the
state. Robert Klitgaard, Democracia y Mercados Libres, Recursos Eficaces Contra la
Corrupci6n, Oct. 4, 2001, http://www.respondanet.com/spanish/anti-corrupcion/
publicaciones/articulos/corrupcionpromocion.htm.
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This article sets out primarily to study the phenomenon of
public corruption in Mexico and the social perceptions of this prob-
lem among a specific section of Mexican society. To this end, it
first draws up a theoretical framework of the issue, describing the
main trends that define the phenomenon and explain its causes. It
then studies the Mexican situation within the current interna-
tional context, outlining the structural features of the Mexican
political system and the way in which they are closely interlinked
with widespread public corruption across the country. Lastly, this
article examines the results of a survey-based study of the differ-
ent social representations of the phenomenon among law students
and professionals in Mexico City.
II. TOWARDS A SINGLE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION
AND AN EXPLANATION OF ITS CAUSES
Corruption is a pathology as ancient as the first civilizations.
It has appeared throughout the ages and across all cultures, vary-
ing in form and intensity. For instance, Hammurabi's Code "regu-
lated the conduct of public officials" long before the emergence of
the modern state.' More than thirteen centuries later, Aristotle
identified three types of government or political regimes (together
with their three respective deviations or forms of corruption) in
his study on politics: kingship, aristocracy and timocracy (also
referred to as a polity).4 Within this context and in particular, he
highlighted tyranny as the deviation or corruption of the kingship,
declaring that, "though both are monarchies, they show the widest
difference, since the tyrant considers his own advantage, but the
king considers the advantage of his subjects."5
Carl Friedrich insinuates that Aristotle's description of tyr-
anny as a corrupt form of monarchy derives from the same basic
principles as the concept of corruption applicable in modern times
to the public official who, against the conventions of routine con-
duct, secretly accepts a bribe to sway his or her decision on a mat-
ter.' However, given the general nature of such a doctrine, finding
an accepted definition is complicated by the fact that present-day
3. Elvira Maria Restrepo de Johnson, Conceptualizacion de la Corrupcion
Politica, in LA CORRUPCION EN COLOMBIA 23 (Fernando Cepeda Ulloa ed., 1997).
4. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 130 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Publ'g
Co. 2d ed. 1999).
5. Id.
6. See Carl J.Friedrich, Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective, in
POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS & CONTEXTS 15, 15 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer &
Michael Johnston eds., 3d ed. 2002) (defining corruption merely as "deviant behavior
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corruption is not legally defined or typified in many penal codes,
but rather constitutes a pre-legal term used primarily in the social
sciences.7 At the same time, the multidimensional nature of the
concept itself also creates a broad range of perspectives across dis-
ciplines and among professionals in various social sciences fields8
(political scientists, sociologists, criminologists, civil servants/
organizations,9 economists, 10 public interest professionals," etc).
For the purposes of this article, concepts within the many existing
perspectives and relating to the scope of civil service activities will
serve as our point of departure, defining as corrupt "a public offi-
cial who makes use of his power for an illegal purpose, motivated
by the desire to achieve private advantage." 2
The debate on the possible causes underlying the emergence
and spread of this social pathology has been equally intense, with
emphasis on structural interpretations by analysts who believe
that corruption is simply a manifest sign of the defects or imbal-
ances in social organization itself.'3 Moreover, they consider it to
be the result of the processes of modernization, economic inequal-
ity, poverty and forms of political dominance. 4 Another camp
argues that a combination of these causes and a series of cultural
associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at public
expense").
7. See, e.g. Agnieszka Klich, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 121, 133 n.63 (stating that the Russian
criminal code does not define the term "corruption").
8. See Francisco M. Suarez, La Multidimensionalidad del Concepto de
Corrupcion (1999), http://www.econ.uba.ar/www/institutos/admin/ceo/simposio99/
suarez.htm.
9. See FRANCISCO J. LAPORTA & SILVINA ALVAREZ, LA CORRUPCION POLITICA 20
(1992); Stephen D. Morris, Corruption and the Mexican Political System: Continuity
and Change, THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999, at 623, 626-627
[hereinafter Morris, Continuity and Change], reprinted in CORRUPTION IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD 102, 105-106 (Robert Williams & Robin Theobald eds., Edward
Elgar Pub. 2000); EDUARDO A. FABIAN CAPARR6S, LA CORRUPCION: ASPECTOS
JURiDICOS Y ECON6MICOS 17 (2000).
10. See generally Jacob Van Klaveren, The Concept of Corruption, in POLITICAL
CORRuPriON: A HANDBOOK 25-28 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston & Victor
T. LeVine eds., 1989).
11. See generally POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPrs & CONTEXTS, supra note 6, at
3-14; Carl J. Friedrich, Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective, in POLITICAL
CORRUPrION: CONCEPTS & CONTEXTS, supra note 6, at 15-23.
12. CAPARROS, supra note 9, at 17 (translation by authors).
13. See, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, Modernization and Corruption, in POLITICAL
CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS & CONTEXTS, supra note 6, at 262 ("Corruption varies
inversely with political organization .... Corruption is most prevalent in states
which lack effective political parties, in societies where interests of the individual, the
family, the clique, or the clan predominate.").
14. See generally James C. Scott, Corruption, Machine Politics and Political
234
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conditions have favored its emergence,15 an approach which finds
resonance with those who structure their interpretations around
market and economic theories. 16 However, depending on the seri-
ousness and extent of the problem in a given country, it is possible
that more than one of these hypotheses offers a logical
explanation.
III. THE MEXICAN SITUATION IN THE CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND THE INFLUENCE OF
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ON THE SPREAD OF
THE CORRUPTION PHENOMENON
The non-governmental organization Transparency Interna-
tional (TI) produces the most comprehensive and recognized Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in the international sphere.
Since changes in the levels of corruption of a country evolve
slowly, TI decided to base the CPI on a three-year average. 7
Therefore, the CPI for the year 2004 is based on surveys and polls
provided between 2002 and 2004, classifying a record number of
146 countries. 8 The CPI gives each country a score corresponding
to its relative level of corruption. These scores have a range
between zero and ten - the lower the number, the more corrupt
the country. 9 The countries are then ranked, based on their score,
in order from least to most corrupt.2" For example, Mexico is tied
for the 64th position in the index with a score of 3.6, which basi-
cally represents the middle of the pack for Latin American coun-
tries.2' Other Latin American countries appear in the index as
follows: Chile (score: 7.4, rank: 20th), Uruguay (score: 6.2, rank:
28th), Costa Rica (score: 4.9, rank: 41st), El Salvador (score: 4.2,
Change, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS & CONTEXTS, supra note 6, at 221-231;
Huntington, supra note 13, at 253-263.
15. See SANDRO GARctA ROJAS CASTILLO, IX CONGRESO INTERNACIONAL DEL CLAD
SOBRE LA REFORMA DEL ESTADO Y DE LA ADMINISTRACIN PBLICA, LA LucHA CONTRA
LA CORRUPCION EN MAXICO: LA REFORMA INTEGRAL EN MATERIA DE JUSTICIA EN EL
MARCO JURfDICO MEXICANO FRENTE AL RETO DE LA LuCHA ANTICORRUPCION 3 (2004),
available at http'//www.clad.org.ve/fulltext/0049908.pdf.
16. See, e.g., Klaveren, supra note 10.
17. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, A SHORT METHODOLOGY NOTE: TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (CPI) 2004 (2004), http:ll
www.transparency.org/content/download/1535/7980/file/method-note-en.pdf.
18. Id.
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rank: tied for 51st), Brazil (score: 3.9, rank: 59th), Belize (score:
3.8, rank: tied for 60th), Colombia (score: 3.8, rank: tied for 60th),
Cuba (score: 3.7, rank: tied for 62nd) and Panama (score: 3.7,
rank: tied for 62nd), Peru (score: 3.5, rank: tied for 67th), the
Dominican Republic (score: 2.9, rank: tied for 87th), Argentina
(score: 2.5, rank: tied for 108th), Ecuador (score: 2.4, rank: tied for
112th), Honduras (score: 2.3, rank: tied for 114th), Venezuela
(score: 2.3, rank: tied for 114th), Bolivia (score: 2.2, rank: tied for
122nd), Guatemala (score: 2.2, rank: tied for 122nd) and Paraguay
(score: 1.9, rank: tied for 140th).22
In October 2001, the organization Transparencia Mexicana
published the results of a survey assessing the level of corruption
in each state in Mexico. The results revealed that Mexico City,
referred to occasionally in this article (and in the Mexican vernac-
ular) as the Federal District, ranked as the most corrupt state in
the country - it was reported that 22.62% of applications made by
citizens were accompanied by bribes, or "mordidas," as they are
commonly called, to the responsible authorities in order to obtain
the respective service requested.23 A second survey, conducted in
2003, showed the level of corruption dropped little, with Mexico
City ranked second among the country's most corrupt states.2 4 It
is currently estimated that the country loses 9.5% of its Gross
Domestic Product due to corruption, 25 and that 23 billion pesos, or
approximately US$2.3 billion, are spent yearly on "mordidas"
alone.26
22. Id.
23. TRANSPARENCIA MEXICANA, ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE CORRUPCION Y BUEN
GOBIERNO 2001. NDICE DE CORRUPCION Y BUEN GOBIERNO POR ENTIDAD FEDERATIVA
(2001), available at http://www.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/ENCBG/#encbg2001
(download the relevant PDF file); see also TRANSPARENCIA MEXICANA, ENCUESTA
NACIONAL DE CORRUPCI6N Y BUEN GOBIERNo 2001 14 (2001), available at http://
www.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/ENCBG/#encbg200l (download the relevant
PDF file).
24. TRANSPARENCIA MEXICANA, ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE CORRUPCION Y BUEN
GOBIERNo 2003. INDICE DE CORRUPCION Y BUEN GOBIERNO POR ENTiDAD FEDERATIVA
(2003), available at http://www.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/ENCBG/#encbg2003;
see also TRANSPARENCIA MEXICANA, ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE CORRUPcION Y BUEN
GOBIERNO 2003 4 (2003), available at http://www.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/
ENCBG/#encbg200l (download the relevant PDF file).
25. CASTILLO, supra note 15, at 6. "This figure equates to [US] $54.1 billion, which
is roughly equal to 37.6% of Government expenditures for 2001, 37.1% of national
banking shares, [and] 33.7% of national foreign debt . . . . This percentage is
significant when taking into account that education accounts for the greatest single
expenditure of the Mexican Government at just 6% of [Gross Domestic Product]." Id.
at 6 n.24 (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 6.
236
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The quest for a clear account of public corruption in Mexico is
a difficult task, given the complexity of its causes and, therefore,
of its solution. Some analysts "blame the system of favors and
patronage that flourished in pre-Hispanic times .... , Others
with stronger leanings towards nationalism argue that corruption
was imported from Spain, noting in particular that the conquista-
dors saw Mexico merely as a pillaging ground. 28 However, inde-
pendence failed to bring about any great change in the customs of
the ruling class as later governments were placed in the hands of
camarillas, factions seeking personal or class advancement.29
Alan Riding, a former bureau chief for The New York Times
in Latin America, claimed in the middle of the 1980s that the
Mexican political system had never existed without corruption,
and that it was essential for it to function and survive, serving as
the "'oil' that makes the wheels of the bureaucratic machine turn
and the 'glue' that seals political alliances."30 However, Stephen D.
Morris, political science professor at University of South Alabama,
asserts that corruption in Mexico "emanates from a structural
imbalance between State and social forces, which actually affords
the Mexican State and its representatives a virtual monopoly over
opportunities for wealth and mobility."" In turn, this absolute
concentration of power creates favorable conditions for wide-
spread political corruption. Morris therefore stressed that corrup-
tion had not simply been a single attribute of the Mexican political
system, but, in actuality, corruption was the Mexican political
system.2
A number of circumstances have led the political system in
Mexico to attract considerable attention at the international level.
Because, for much of its modern history (nearly seventy years), it
has been almost entirely dominated by a single political regime,
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), Mexico has been able
to achieve a level of stability and dominance of civil government
unequaled by any other Latin American state for such a long
period of time.3 The structural features that have characterized
27. ALAN RIDING, DIsTANT NEIGHBORS: A PORTRAIT OF THE MEXICANS 113 (1985).
28. Id. at 114.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. STEPHEN D. MORRIS, CORRUPCI6N POLITICA EN EL MVxICo CONTEMPORANEO 63
(1992) [hereinafter MORRIS, CORRUPCION POLITICA] (translation by authors).
32. Morris, Continuity and Change, supra note 9, at 102.
33. See RODERIC Ai CAMP, POLITICS IN MEXICO: THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITARIANISM
67, 174-75 (3d ed. 1999) (detailing, respectively, (1) PRI presidents beginning in 1934,
and (2) the PRI's recent political victories as well as its ability to adapt).
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the political system over the years, distinguishing it from other
similar systems, are as follows: authoritarianism, clientelism, cor-
poratism and presidentialism.
34
The Mexican system might be described most simply as
authoritarian.3 But this characterization is somewhat mislead-
ing: Mexico is in no way comparable with true authoritarian coun-
tries, such as Cuba, China and the former Soviet Union. 6 It is best
described as a "semi-authoritarian" political system.37 Roderic Ai
Camp, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College,
describes it as a "hybrid of political liberalism and authoritarian-
ism," and, from the mid-1990s, as a "system in transition," with
past practices thriving alongside the great challenges yet ahead. 8
Practices of clientelism, another structural feature of the
Mexican political system, present an additional factor that for
years helped the government to maintain power and stability.39
The Mexican ruling class used the state party to build a paternal-
istic hierarchy within which its highest profile members were in
charge of distributing benefits such as public posts, money and
any type of asset to the lower members of the hierarchy, receiving
their loyalty and faithfulness in return.4 ° Possibly the most telling
aspect of clientelism regarding its recruitment of the privileged is
"the political clique, the camarilla."61 A camarilla can be defined
as "a group of persons who share political interests, and rely on
one another to improve their chances in the political leadership."42
These camarillas have "determined, more than any other variable
discussed, who goes to the top of the political ladder, what paths
are taken, and the specific posts they are assigned."43 Over the
years, Mexican political culture has predisposed its political sys-
tem to a dependency on the existence of these camarillas.11
Present throughout Latin American countries, corporatism,
34. See id. at 8-13; see generally MARIO CACIAGLI, CLIENTELISMO, CORRUPCION Y
CRIMINALIDAD ORGANIZADA (1996); see also infra notes 34-64 and accompanying text.




39. CACIAGLI, supra note 33, at 18. "Clientelism can be defined as a dyadic
relationship, whereby a person of higher status, the patron, uses his influence and
resources to facilitate the protection and benefits afforded to a person of lesser status,
the client, who offers services and/or support." Id. (translation by authors).
40. Id.
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the third structural feature of the Mexican political system, was
established in the 1930s, largely during the presidency of General
Lazaro Cardenas, who was in power from 1934 to 1940.41 Corpo-
ratism implies a corporate relationship between the state and key
social or interest groups.46 In this way, the government placed
itself in an advantageous position, representing the most conflict-
ing of social interests while simultaneously acting as arbiter of the
most diverse social needs.47 The largest and most important inter-
est groups were absorbed by the PRI, thereby acquiring legitimacy
and a key role in matters of both the party and the country.48 The
PRI could not therefore be conceptualized simply as a conven-
tional political party, being at once "a political, economic and
social system.
49
The fourth structural feature, presidentialism, is "the central-
ization of authority in the executive branch.""° The formal powers
of the President derive from the Constitution,5' but until only
recently a spectrum of informal or meta-constitutional powers
existed within the system, giving the President the ability to: 1)
amend the Constitution, 2) designate a successor and 3) designate
or remove the majority of public posts including those of governors
and legislators.52 Appointing positions, including personal succes-
sors, from among friends or family members is a practice known
as "dedazo."53 It was dedazo, more than any other meta-constitu-
tional power, that permitted the hegemony of the executive over
the PRI and the other constitutional powers for so many years.'
There can be no doubt, too, that such connections lead to increased
wealth of presidents, their relatives and their friends.55




49. MANUEL ALCANTARA SAEZ, SISTEMAS POLITICOS DE AMARICA LATINA: VOLUMEN
II: Mtxico, AMPRICA CENTRAL Y EL CARIBE 60 (1999) (translation by authors).
50. CAMP, supra note 32, at 11.
51. CAROLE J. WILSON, PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION IN MEXICO 3
(1998), available at http://136.142.158.105/LASA98/Wilson.pdf.
52. Id. at 3-4.
53. See Javier Livas, The Mexican Election System As a Violation of International
Human Rights Law, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 373, 379 n.6 (1994) (defining
dedazo as "a colloquial expression for the process whereby the President handpicks
individuals for key political positions").
54. See Luis Carlos Ugalde, The Transformation of Mexican Presidentialism,
1929-2000, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 115, 120 (2001).
55. See, e.g., ANDRS OPPENHEIMER, Ojos VENDADOs: EsTADos UNIDOS Y EL
NEGOCIO DE LA CORRUPCI6N EN AMERICA LATINA 240-241, 254-273 (2d ed. 2001)
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2
Although Mexico has always been able to rely on opposition
political parties, no one from these parties had occupied signifi-
cant government positions until 1988.56 In 1988, Cuauht~moc Cdr-
denas led the most successful opposition presidential campaign
known to date, losing the elections amidst turmoil and rumors of
vote-rigging. 7 Despite the official result, it was increasingly recog-
nized, from 1988 onwards (if not earlier), that the traditional dom-
inance of the PRI as a hegemonic party was no longer invincible in
the country.58
Seeking on the one hand to lend his government credibility,
and on the other to mollify the opposition, former President
[Carlos Salinas (1988-1994)] increased the opportunities
for opposition politicians to assume power both at the local
and state levels. This strategy mainly benefited the
National Action Party (PAN), whose free market economic
policies closely resembled those of the technocratic group in
power.... Former President Salinas' six-year term ended
when he stepped down from his post, accused in the public
eye of having created one of the most corrupt governments
in the history of modern-day Mexico and of abusing public
power for private gain, for that of this family and of those
close to him during his mandate, as well as leaving the
country bankrupt.59
President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) constantly reaffirmed
the Republican presidency, leaving decisions in the hands of Con-
gress or local competent authorities that in other eras were con-
trolled from Los Pinos (the President's official residence).' He
renounced the power to name his successor, which to a large
extent was a transcendental factor without which the process of
transition to democracy in 2000 could not have occurred."
The elections in 2000 ended the 71-year governmental
hegemony of the PRI, but likewise ended the three inalien-
able conditions of Mexican presidentialism: a united gov-
(discussing former President Carlos Salinas' monetary situation in conjunction with
that of several of his relatives).
56. See WILSON, supra note 50, at 6-7.
57. Id.
58. Leonardo Curzio Gutidrrez, La Gobernabilidad en el Mexico Contemporario,
REVISTA CIDOB D'AFERS INTERNACIONALS, No. 40-41, 1998, at 197-199, available at
http://www.cidob.org/castellano/publicaciones/Afers/40-4lcurzio.cfm.
59. CASTILLO, supra note 15, at 8-9 (translation by authors) (internal citations
omitted).
60. Id. at 9-10.
61. See id. at 10.
240
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ernment, strict discipline within the party in power, and
the leadership of the President of the Republic of his own
party. Mexico owed its transition from a hyper-presiden-
tialist regime to that of a presidentialist system through a
process which lasted more than ten years.62
Over time, the popularity of President Vicente Fox has
waned, at least in part because, so far, he has been unsuccessful in
ending, or even in mitigating, to any significant degree some of the
most serious problems facing the country: poverty, corruption, an
inefficient legal system and a lingering impunity enjoyed by many
of those in power.6' There is no question that the political changes
of recent years have contributed to changes in the structural con-
ditions which in the past have created widespread public corrup-
tion. Moreover, recognition must be given to the efforts made both
by the present and by the previous government to fight corruption
at the national and international level by actively participating in
developing and maintaining supranational instruments such as
the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Con-
vention, the European Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
and the future United Nations Convention Against Corruption.
However, it is highly unlikely that corruption levels persisting in
Mexican society as a whole will decrease in the immediate future,
and the government will have to be watchful if it wishes to pre-
vent the possible emergence of fresh corrupt practices or allow
more virulent forms to take hold.'
Federico Reyes Heroles, President of the Consejo Directivo de
Transparencia Internacional Mdxico, argues that the war against
corruption should not be waged merely in a legal or administra-
tive arena. Reyes Heroles argues that if Mexican society fails col-
lectively to embrace responsibility for modifying its system of
values, and if personal integrity is not fostered, corruption will
always find an ideal breeding ground from whence it may emerge
and reproduce. 5
62. Id. (translation by authors) (internal citations omitted).
63. See generally LAuRA CARLSEN, MEXICO AT THE CROSSROADS (2002), available at
http://americas.irc-online.orgpdf/reports/0204mexico.pdf.
64. See generally Morris, Continuity and Change, supra note 9; see also Kimberly
Ann Elliott, Corruption as an International Policy Problem, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION:
CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS, supra note 6, at 925.
65. Federico Reyes Heroles, Corrupcion y Valores, CRONICA LEGISLATIVA, No. 12,
Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 90, 92, available at http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/cronica57/contenido/
cont12/pdf12.pdf.
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IV. SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF PUBLIC
CORRUPTION IN MEXICO
A. Preface to the Study
The social phenomenon of public corruption creates interest-
ing attitudes and perceptions among certain sections of society.
The present analysis attempts to identify the representations of
the phenomenon among law students and professionals in the
Federal District.66 The nature of the legal community is such that
it has close contact with the diverse sectors of the public adminis-
tration in any country, allowing community members to form per-
ceptions based on the practices of the public administration in the
society in which they evolve. 7 Finally, the Mexico City community
was chosen because it rated highest (most corrupt) on Trans-
parencia Mexicana's 2001 corruption index (during which time the
study discussed in this article was conducted).6 ' The relevancy of
this study is supported by the fact that Mexico City has demon-
strated its consistency regarding its level of corruption, as indi-
cated by the fact that it rated as the second highest state on
Transparencia Mexicana's 2003 corruption index. 9
The study was comprised of 294 questionnaires completed
between December 3, 2001 and January 15, 2002 (inclusive). The
sample consisted of a group of civil servants of the judiciary (each
assigned to a court in each of the three reclusorios (detention cen-
ters) of Mexico City), a group of civil servants from two agencies of
the Public Ministry of the Office of the Attorney General of Jus-
tice, a group of private attorneys, and several groups of law stu-
dents from three Mexico City universities (one public and two
private). Since the survey was not based on an entirely random
sample, the results should be understood as guidelines and not as
being representative of the entire population, although the data
nonetheless provide an important indicator of the social represen-
66. A social representation is always that of the subject, whether that subject is an
individual, a social or family group, or a team; in relation to another subject, it is the
perception that one forms of the other. A social representation is not a duplicate of
what is real or ideal, or the subjective part of the object, or the objective part of the
subject; it is the relation of man to things and to other men. In this way, "social
representations must be seen as an 'environment' in relation to the individual or the
group; and ... they are, in certain respects, specific to our society." Serge Moscovici,
The Phenomenon of Social Representations, in SocLAL REPRESENTATIONS 3, 23 (Robert
M. Farr & Serge Moscovici eds., 1984).
67. JEAN-CLAUDE COMBESSIE, EL MtTODO EN SOCIOLOGIA 18-19 (2000).
68. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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tations of the phenomenon among a key section of the legal society
in Mexico City. Of the total number of people surveyed, 23.8%
were professionals and 76.2% were law students; 61.3% were
employed; and the average age of the sample was twenty-four
years, thirty-one for professionals and twenty-one for students.
B. Analysis of the Study
The sample of the legal community in the Federal District
was asked in one of the questions to rate on a scale of one (very
slight) to five (very serious) the seriousness of various problems
faced by the Federal District. The responses are set out in Table 1,
which ranks the problems, in order from highest to lowest, accord-
ing to the total percentage each received from those surveyed who
rated the particular problem as either 'serious' or 'very serious.'
The Table also breaks down responses by the respondents' respec-
tive broad occupational categories. As the Table reveals, those
who carry out activities in the private sector, as well as students,
tended to rate the public corruption problem as more serious than
those who work in the public sector. As far as raw scores received,
the three problems with the highest (most serious) average rat-
ings were public insecurity and crime (4.63), unemployment (4.36)
and public corruption (4.31).
TABLE 1
Percentage Rated 'Serious' or
Problem 'Very Serious'
Public Private Students Total
Public insecurity and crime 94.4% 93.8% 87.9% 91.6%
Unemployment 90.0% 85.0% 82.5% 85.5%
Public corruption 77.6% 87.6% 83.9% 82.9%
Economic recession 73.0% 77.6% 77.2% 76.0%
Police forces 72.7% 76.0% 73.6% 74.0%
Trafficking and consumption 76.7% 67.1% 70.7% 71.6%
of drugs
Access to legal aid 50.6% 79.7% 68.7% 66.1%
Lack of housing 59.5% 64.6% 68.7% 64.7%
Availability of legal aid 43.8% 75.1% 73.5% 64.5%
Cost of living 70.5% 68.3% 56.9% 64.3%
Cost of education 52.3% 64.6% 56.3% 57.3%
Cost of health services 52.8% 60.3% 58.9% 57.3%
Corruption in the private •36.0% 39.8% 58.3% 45.8%
sector
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Assuming that public corruption is socially perceived by the
legal community of the Federal District as one of the most serious
problems afflicting the Federal District and doubtless the rest of
the country too - given that nearly 83% of those surveyed rated it
as 'serious' or 'very serious,' above even economic recession and
behind only unemployment and public insecurity and crime - it is
worth questioning how to proceed in order to prevent acts of cor-
ruption in which members of the legal community intervene.
Three possible mechanisms were considered in the study, each in
response to its respective answer to the question of whether: 1) it
is the public official who seeks the bribe, 2) it is the lawyer who
offers the bribe, or 3) the sum of the bribe to be paid is already
understood. Should the public official seek the bribe, it can be
assumed that the act of corruption is the result of a decision made
by that same official at his own risk, thus taking advantage of the
power afforded by his post to award benefits or impose penalties.
Should the lawyer take the initiative, it can be assumed that he
may offer the bribe, again at his own risk, in order to induce a
susceptible public official to be bribed into neglecting the duties of
his post. If the sum of the bribe to be paid is understood simulta-
neously by both parties, this suggests that corrupt practices con-
stitute a routine part of public administration and that it is not
necessary to make an explicit invitation to become involved in
what would otherwise be deemed as irregular conduct. This might
be called the institutionalization of corruption, whereby corrupt
conduct takes on maximally objective characteristics and any
acknowledgement of personal responsibility is absent.
As can be observed in Table 2, the great majority of respon-
dents consider that the mechanism whereby corruption operates
consists of procedures already established, known and followed by
public officials and lawyers alike. In total, nearly two-thirds of
respondents said that "everyone knows how much you need to
pay," while a far a lower percentage of respondents claimed that it
is the lawyer who offers the bribe, and even fewer blame the offi-
cial for seeking it. At first glance, this result, however, appears
somewhat deceptive. It must be noted that, to a large extent, the
distribution of these results may have been affected by the skewed
composition of the sample, of which 76.2% were students (even
though many of these student subjects were employed at the time
as well). Professionals and students apparently responded in an
entirely contrasting manner. While about 60% of the professionals
blamed the lawyer for soliciting the bribe, approximately 75% of
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the students believed that the corruption mechanism is already
established and precedes the actions of both officials and lawyers.
Interestingly, the two groups both seem to rule out the possibility
that it is the official who initiates the act of bribery.
TABLE 2
A Lawyer Pays a Bribe Status Total
Because:
Professional Student
The public official seeks the 13.2% 11.4% 11.8%
bribe
The lawyer offers the bribe 60.3% 12.7% 24.0%
The sum to be paid is already 26.5% 75.9% 64.2%
understood
Total 100% 100% 100%
However, Table 3, which distinguishes between the public
and the private employment sectors, suggests that it is the sector
in which the person is employed, rather than that person's status
as either student or professional, that explains the differences in
perceptions of the corruption mechanism. Employees in the public
sector tended to attribute a greater role to the lawyer in initiating
acts of bribery, whereas the great majority of private sector
employees tended to believe that corruption mechanisms are
already established in the apparatus of the public administration
itself. It should be highlighted, moreover, that there is also an
appreciable perception in the public sector that corruption is insti-
tutionalized, particularly among students.
TABLE 3




Public official seeks 13.1% 3.6% 10.1%
the bribe
The lawyer
offers the 65.6% 46.4% 59.6%
bribe
The sum to be
paid is already 21.3% 50.0% 30.3%
understood
Total 100% 100% 100%
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The public
Private official seeks 16.7% 12.2% 12.5%
the bribe
The lawyer
offers the 0% 12.2% 11.3%
bribe
The sum to be
paid is already 83.3% 75.7% 76.3%
understood
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 4 indicates that approximately two-thirds of the sample
surveyed believed that one can use a bribe to obtain efficient ser-
vice from the administration with a high or very high probability
of success. Again, the public and private sectors of employment
differed noticeably in their responses. Although responses in both
sectors recognized bribery as a highly effective mechanism, 90% of
the private sector respondents rated the probability of the bribe
securing efficient service as high or very high, whereas slightly
fewer than half of those in the public sector gave it the same
rating.
TABLE 4
Probability That the Bribe Sector of Employment
Will Be Successful Total
Public Private
Very low 16.9% 0% 8.9%
Low 9.0% 0% 4.7%
Medium 25.8% 12.5% 19.5%
High 27.0% 36.3% 31.4%
Very high 21.3% 51.3% 35.5%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Interestingly, the economic component involved in the corrup-
tion phenomenon becomes evident after comparing Tables 2, 3 and
4. As indicated by the social perception of the legal community, if
the practice of bribery becomes a procedure that forms a routine
part of the duties performed by a public administrative body, such
bribery may be made possible by the mere existence of a high
degree of impunity. Where the risk of punishment is low, so too is
the cost of corruption for the public official with relatively high
gain. Given that the official can exercise his decision-making pow-
ers with discretion, he may thus allow the tolerance of established
irregular practices to determine the direction the lawyer takes in
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certain matters. Comparatively, again where the risk of punish-
ment is low, the cost to the lawyer of refusing to pay a bribe (espe-
cially one that is generally considered standard industry practice)
is very high, since it seemingly implies that he is virtually incom-
petent in the eyes of his clients. Faced with such a situation, there
can hardly be any doubt as to which path the lawyer will choose,
given that the typicality of the situation is unlikely to lead to pro-
fessional censure, social disapproval or personal self-reproach.
This perception of the nature of corruption demonstrated in
Table 4 is consistent with the fact that almost 60% of respondents
said that in the last two years they had been required to pay a
bribe in order to obtain a service or resolve a problem which in
some way depended on the public administration of the Federal
District. This social perception is also supported by the fact that
about 75% of the respondents had witnessed - either indirectly or
directly - acts of corruption relating to the public administration
of the Federal District over the last two years. As Table 5 illus-
trates, only 6.5% of those who found themselves in such a situa-
tion said that they had reported the incident.
TABLE 5
Responses to an Act of Status
Corruption Witnessed Total
Professional Student
Reported the incident 2.2% 7.6% 6.5%
Did not report the incident 97.8% 92.4% 93.5%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 6 presents the respondents' ratings of the importance of
various reasons for not reporting witnessed acts of corruption.
These reasons are ranked in Table 6 according to the percentage
of respondents that classified each as 'important' or 'very impor-
tant.' As can be seen, the reasons that were given the highest rat-
ings express an attitude of pessimism and resignation based on
the conviction that citizens are powerless in the face of an appara-
tus established by the political system itself to ensure the impu-
nity of those who perform public duties. The fact that fear of
backlash ranked the highest reveals a feeling of helplessness on
the part of the citizenry when contending with public power. The
figures in this Table show how the perception of the corruption
phenomenon is molded by the structural features of the Mexican
political system. If Mexicans have learned to accept corruption,
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2
partly because they recognize it as a source of benefits obtainable
under suitable circumstances, they are also clearly aware that,
while not oppressive per se, the system created by such corruption
has certain authoritarian features.
TABLE 6
Incidents of Corruption Are Not Percentage Rated 'Important' or
Reported Because: 'Very Important'
There is no protection against 76.6%
possible backlash
Those reported are able to avoid 731%
punishment
Neither proper investigation nor 67.4%
punishment are carried out
Legal instruments are inefficient 60.6%
It is impossible to prove 50.0%
Procedures are too complicated 50.0%
Corruption is culturally accepted 47.2%
in Mexico
The economic situation justifies 41.3%
corruption
The corruption is too trivial to 32.6%
justify reporting
One section of the questionnaire was aimed to obtain the per-
ception of corruption as occurring in relations between businesses
and the public administration of the Federal District. The first
question asked respondents to rate the probability that a business
would have to pay bribes in order to expand. The second question
asked respondents to rate the probability that bribes would have
to be paid for a contract to be awarded. Table 7 illustrates that
only a small percentage - scarcely 7.5% - believed that the
probability that a business must pay such bribes in order to
expand is relatively low (signified by a rating of one or two on the
questionnaires), whereas over 76% thought that the probability is
relatively high (signified by a rating of four or five on the question-
naires). Likewise, comparatively few of the respondents surveyed
believed there was a relatively low probability (signified by a rat-
ing of one or two on the questionnaires) that bribes are necessary
in order for a business to obtain a contract (approximately 12%),
whereas a high percentage of respondents considered it relatively
highly probable (signified by a rating of four or five on the ques-
tionnaires) that a business seeking to secure a contract would
need to pay bribes (approximately 74%).
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TABLE 7
I. Probability That a Business II. Probability That a Business
Must Pay Bribes in Order to Must Pay Bribes in Order to
Expand Secure a Contract
Probability Probability
5 (High Probability) 49.8% 5 (High Probability) 41.3%
4 26.6% 4 33.1%
3 16.0% 3 13.3%
2 5.1% 2 8.9%
1 (Low Probability) 2.4% 1 (Low Probability) 3.4%
Given that in recent years an opposition party has governed
the Federal District, it seemed appropriate to question whether
the probability of resorting to bribery has increased or decreased
over that period of time. Table 8 shows the responses. While some
46% thought that the probability had increased, only slightly
fewer than 20% believed it had decreased. Approximately one-






Bribery in Last Valid Cumulative
Five Years Frequency Percentage Percentage Percentage
Large decrease 17 5.8% 5.8% 5.8%
Slight decrease 39 13.3% 13.3% 19.1%
No change 102 34.7% 34.8% 53.9%
Slight increase 80 27.2% 27.3% 81.2%
Large increase 55 18.7% 18.8% 100%
Total 293 99.7% 100%
Did not respond 1 0.3% 9
Total 294 100%
The administration of Mexico's dominant party, PRI, which
until recent elections exercised a political monopoly, has been fre-
quently criticized because of the high and growing levels of cor-
ruption for which it was characterized.7 0 The promise of a
responsible and transparent civil service has been one of the main
70. See, e.g., Morris, Continuity and Change, supra note 9, at 102-103.
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campaign issues of the leading opposition parties.71
It can be expected that the perception among citizens varies
according to their partisan sympathies and loyalties. Tables 9 and
11 demonstrate, to a large extent, just this proposition. Table 9
confirms that there is in fact widespread skepticism that corrup-
tion has decreased. As indicated, it is indeed PRI-sympathizers
who most consistently considered the corruption situation to have
further deteriorated since that party has lost some of its political
power. These PRI-sympathizers apparently believe that the oppo-
sition parties are not genuinely intent upon changing the political
system for the better but rather seek total political control as well
as, and more importantly, the privileges such power would afford
them. Those who have recently come to power are therefore per-
ceived as greedier than those they have replaced and also as lack-
ing the experience to keep corruption under a certain degree of
control. This hypothesis draws support from the fact that 52% of
the PRI-sympathizers who contributed to this study asserted that
the probability of corruption has increased, compared to 37% of
the total sample that share the same view. As one might have
expected, the most positive impression was found among those for
whom the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) (the governing
party in the Federal District) is the party of preference, of whom
35% believed that the probability has decreased. Those who sym-
pathize with the National Action Party (PAN) adopt an intermedi-
ate stance, with 50% believing that nothing has changed or that
there has been some improvement. It is interesting that those who
claim to have no partisan preferences are those who take the sec-
ond most pessimistic stance. They are apparently skeptical of
opposition parties' claims that they can downscale or eradicate
corruption if elected.
71. See, e.g., id. at 112.
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TABLE 9
Increase or Party of Preference
Decrease in Total
Probability of
Corruption in PAN PRD PRI Other None
Last Five Years
Large decrease 6.1% 18.6% 1.6% 0% 2.5% 5.2%
Slight decrease 18.4% 16.3% 12.9% 9.1% 10.7% 13.2%
No change 26.5% 44.2% 24.2% 45.5% 39.3% 34.8%
Slight increase 28.6% 18.6% 32.3% 27.3% 27.9% 27.5%
Large increase 20.4% 2.3% 29.0% 18.2% 19.7% 19.2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
On the basis of the results in the Tables studied so far, one
could expect negative responses to the question of whether the
government of the Federal District combats corruption effectively,
and this was indeed the case. Table 10 shows that 'occasionally'
was the most positive response to the aforementioned question,
shared by a substantial percentage of the sample (approximately








Effectively? Frequency Percentage Percentage Percentage
Never 47 16.0% 16.3% 16.3%
Hardly ever 107 36.4% 37.2% 53.5%
Occasionally 113 38.4% 39.2% 92.7%
Often 15 5.1% 5.2% 97.9%
Always 6 2.0% 2.1% 100%
Total 288 98.0% 100%
Did not respond 6 2.0%
Total 294 100%
Regarding this same question, variations similar to those in
Table 9 appear once more to be based on party preference, as
exhibited in Table 11. Accordingly, PRI-sympathizers gave the
government of the Federal District the most negative assessment.
However, scarcely one-third of those who express a preference for
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PAN concede that the Federal District government sometimes
combats corruption correctly. The most positive assessment is
given by PRD-sympathizers, who nonetheless tended more often
towards an assessment of 'never' or 'hardly ever' than towards
'often' or 'always.' Like PRD-sympathizers, the majority of sympa-
thizers of a party other than the three leading parties and of those
who did not have a preference for any one party conceded that the
Federal District government only 'occasionally' combats corrup-
tion effectively.
TABLE 11
Does theGovernment of the Party of PreferenceGovenmet oftheTotal
Federal District
CombatCorut PAN PRD PRI Other NoneCorruption
Effectively?
Never 20.8% 2.3% 21.0% 27.3% 16.8% 16.5%
Hardly ever 37.5% 29.5% 43.5% 27.3% 38.7% 37.7%
Occasionally 33.3% 45.5% 32.3% 45.5% 40.3% 38.4%
Often 6.3% 13.6% 1.6% 0% 4.2% 5.3%
Always 2.1% 9.1% 1.6% 0% 0% 2.1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
The prevailing perception of the causes of the corruption phe-
nomenon in Mexico among the surveyed members of the legal
community reveals underlying elements of the main explanations
that have been offered in and by the social sciences. Table 12
shows that the four causes that were most often cited as 'impor-
tant' or 'very important' were 1) the loss of values and ethical prin-
ciples which has accompanied the Mexican modernization process,
2) the evolution of a culture of illegality as a response to the impu-
nity enjoyed by public officials and social groups surrounding
those in positions of power, 3) the greed or ambition of civil ser-
vants and 4) the economic inequality and poverty, which have
both intensified during the modernization process. The fact that
these were considered to be the most important causes of corrup-
tion is consistent with this article's characterization of the Mexi-
can political system as being clientelistic, paternalistic and a
centralizing authority. Above all, these causes are consistent with
the hypothesis that the Mexican political system supports, though
not necessarily on a conscious level, the institutionalization of
corruption.
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TABLE 12
Percentage Rated 'Important' or
Causes of Corruption in Mexico 'Very Important'
Severe loss of ethical principles in 85.7%
society 85.7%
Existence of a culture of illegality
where certain social groups and 82.7%
public officials are assured of
impunity before the law
Greed or ambition on the part of 82.2%
civil servants
Poverty and economic inequality 80.1%
in society
Greed or ambition of political 76.8%
leaders
Greed or ambition of businessmen 66.4%
A system of responsibilities for
public officials that is obsolete
or inadequate in the face of the 66.1%
national reality
Low salaries of low- to medium- 65.3%
profile civil servants
Ignorance on the part of political 532%
leaders
Ignorance on the part of civil 46.1%
servants
Low salaries of high-profile public
officials
Lack of legislation 36.5%
A final question asked to respondents which we have ana-
lyzed is that of how to rate the seriousness of a series of corrup-
tion-related failings. Unlike most of the previous questions, this
one does not relate to the perception of social practices in that,
here, the respondents were not obliged to admit to or imply
involvement in corruption or to place blame on the processes of a
system which they may have been neither responsible for nor able
to avoid. Here, the respondents were asked to describe their own
hierarchy of values and personal ethic.
Table 13 clearly depicts specific forms of corruption which for
many are not considered serious, and are therefore seemingly
somewhat excusable or permissible, because they ostensibly con-
stitute the fulfillment of duties imposed by particular social rela-
tions networks. One example of what many respondents seemed to
believe was a relatively trivial corrupt action, and therefore
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apparently somewhat permissible, was that of a public official
securing a government post for a family member (39.2% of respon-
dents considered this form of corruption as less than 'serious').
Likewise, a situation where an individual grants an official favors
or pays a sum of money and in return the official, for example,
expedites an application (32.5% of respondents considered this
form of corruption as less than 'serious') or enables that individual
to avoid paying a fine (35.5% of respondents considered this form
of corruption as less than 'serious') was similarly perceived by a
relatively large percentage of respondents (though by a smaller
percentage than in the example above) as rather trivial and thus
somewhat excusable. Apparently, the most acceptable example of
corruption was payment by an attorney to a security guard in
order to gain access to a client (45.3% of respondents considered
this form of corruption as less than 'serious'). On the other hand,
actions which were condemned as being more serious, and there-
fore clearly illegal and punishable, by the largest percentage of
respondents included embezzlement (8.3% of respondents consid-
ered this form of corruption as less than 'serious'), bribery for
granting the release of a criminal (12.1% of respondents consid-
ered this form of corruption as less than 'serious') and diversion of
public funds (12.2% of respondents considered this form of corrup-
tion as less than 'serious').
Not only do these responses indicate that there are degrees of
tolerance with respect to corruption, but they also provide an
insight into a culture of corruption in which traditional values and
conventional norms are seemingly placed above the universal eth-
ical principles at the heart of western civilization. Actions aimed
at promoting a better future in this regard should include efforts
to make the workings of the Mexican government more transpar-
ent and, in the process, make corruption more visible to the public.
This would hopefully lead to a certain general attitude change
among the public, and would ultimately promote socio-behavioral
changes.
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TABLE 13
Percentage Rated 'Serious' or
Situation 'Very Serious'
A public official embezzles money
from the government for 91.7%
personal use
A criminal buys his freedom 87.9%
A public official diverts public
funds, to which his post affords
him access, to projects or people
of his choice
A lawyer bribes the Public 74.6%
Ministry
An individual pays a bribe for the
handling of a bureaucratic 67.5%
matter
An individual bribes the police to 64.5%
avoid a fine
A public official secures a
government post for a family 60.8%
member
A litigator rewards the security
guards of a detention center in
order to gain speedier access to
his client
V. Proposed Strategy to Fight Corruption
During the last several years, the topics of prevention and
reduction of corruption have been viewed mainly from the legal or
institutional perspectives. There is no doubt that this approach is
clearly necessary in the fight against corruption. However, in
future years these perspectives will surely be insufficient if they
are not joined by a complementary strategy which includes a fun-
damental change in the system of values of Mexican society. Only
this type of approach, aimed at familiarizing the Mexican public
with and indoctrinating it in a more ethical political culture, will
truly allow for new anti-corruption measures and regulations to
be accepted by Mexican society.
In that sense, this article now points out five basic compo-
nents of a possible strategy against corruption: consistently sanc-
tion transgressors, involve civil society in the diagnosis of corrupt
systems, concentrate prevention by repairing corrupt systems,
provide incentives for reform and strengthen international cooper-
ation against corruption.
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A. Consistently Sanction Transgressors
When a culture is imbued with deeply ingrained, widespread
impunity, the only way to break away from this negative perme-
ation is by consistently punishing, at the same time, both a signifi-
cant quantity of notorious corrupt individuals and a considerable
number corrupt public officials,72 regardless of the level of their
position. In fact, the more visible the public official is, the better.73
In other words, to combat the generalization of a culture of impu-
nity, it is necessary to generalize and instill a culture of legality.
In order to achieve this objective, it is imperative to start with a
serious revision of criminal anti-corruption legislation. This effort
would be aimed at increasing the risk as much as possible both for
those officials who decide to deviate from the normal legal func-
tions of their public posts by accepting bribes and for the individu-
als who offer such bribes.74
B. Involve Civil Society in the Diagnosis of Corrupt
Systems
Successful anti-corruption campaigns must involve the entire
society. If it becomes possible to instill and motivate a culture of
legality in the Mexican population, the citizens will become "fer-
tile sources of information regarding where corruption exists."75
Possible mechanisms that can be utilized in consulting the citi-
zenry include (but are certainly not limited to): 1) conducting sys-
tematic surveys of citizens and government officials, 2) creating
and maintaining civil and/or professional organizations to keep
public agencies under surveillance, 3) creating and maintaining
direct government phone lines and other paths of communication
dedicated to reporting incidents of corruption, 4) instituting a
mechanism for private consultations as to the legality of certain
actions, 5) instituting educational programs to instruct both pub-
lic officials and citizens together as to what constitutes corruption
and the types of punishments generally imposed and 6) creating
and maintaining village and neighborhood commissions aimed at
rooting out possible corrupt persons.6
72. Klitgaard, supra note 2.
73. See id.; ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 55-57 (1988).
74. See generally MANUAL PREPADO POR RECOMENDACION DEL CONSEJO ECONOMICO
Y SOCIAL DE LAs NAcIONEs UNIDAS, in LA CORRUPCION EN COLOMBIA, supra note 3, at
263, 263-302.
75. Klitgaard, supra note 2 (translation by authors).
76. Id.
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C. Concentrate Prevention by Repairing Corrupt
Systems
Metaphorically, corruption can be characterized by the follow-
ing formula or "Basic Equation:"
"Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion - Responsibility"
7
Obviously, the current Mexican legal system, including its
now-existing laws and controls, has proved to be inadequate in
preventing corruption. Therefore, combating public corruption in
Mexico, or any other country for that matter, should begin by
installing better diagnostic and disciplinary systems, implement-
ing "vulnerability" evaluations to help anticipate and predict pos-
sible future hotbeds of corruption,78 and instituting educational
programs and preventative measures in the public sector. 9
Although creating incorruptible officials and citizens overnight is
impossible, it may be possible to promote competency, change
incentives and improve accountability in the public sector. In
short, replacing the corrupt public officials alone will not remedy
the situation; the legal system itself, which currently promotes
(or, at least, turns a blind eye towards) corruption, must be
repaired.
D. Provide Incentives for Reform
Governments that wish to stop the corruption of their public
officials should offer more incentives to counter it."° These incen-
tives should include those of an economic nature, such as pay
raises, bonuses, etc." When typical public sector salaries fall so
low that families cannot live on them, it should not come as a sur-
prise that under such conditions corruption prospers.
E. Strengthen International Cooperation Against
Corruption
Considering the current international context and the fact
that in many cases corrupt officeholders escape from their coun-
tries with the proverbial fruit of their corrupt labors in tow (gener-
ally either to fiscal paradises or to other countries where
extradition treaties do not exist or have no force), a strategy
77. KLITGAARD, supra note 73, at 75.
78. Id. at 83-85.
79. See id. at 90-91.
80. Id. at 77-82.
81. Id.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2
against corruption will always be incomplete unless it contains a
component that strengthens international cooperation.82 In and of
itself, it is vital that countries like Mexico join all possible interna-
tional initiatives, in this way facilitating the exchange of informa-
tion and the prosecution of these criminals across national
borders.
VI. CONCLUSION
The clientelistic, paternalistic and centralizing characteristics
of authority in the Mexican political system seem to promote, or at
least preserve, a hierarchy of values and personal ethics inclined
to condone corruption. At least among those subjects sampled in
this study, and almost certainly among most others living and
working in the Mexico, governmental corruption constitutes one of
the most serious problems in today's Mexican society. This study
has helped to show that the general social representation of cor-
ruption in Mexico City is apparently one of institutionalization.
According to this seemingly dominant social representation, acts
of corruption are not merely isolated events attributable to deci-
sions made by the officials who take advantage of their posts for
personal benefit or by the lawyers who look to induce the officials
into overlooking their duties. These corrupt actions have actually
become systematized practices that conform to the apparent
habitual and ethical norms of Mexican public administration. In
effect, involvement in situations requiring bribery has become
unavoidable for the lawyers who want to successfully negotiate
government matters. Unfortunately, as it now stands, Mexican
lawyers must conform to this corruption culture in order to be per-
ceived as competent professionals by their clientele.
This general social representation is strengthened for many
Mexico City attorneys by the all too common experience of either
having had to resort to bribery in relations with public officials or
having been witness to such. In accordance with this social repre-
sentation, and indeed contributing to it, is the fact that these cor-
rupt actions often go unreported (and therefore unpunished), as
demonstrated by this study. This study suggests there is a wide-
spread conviction that Federal District citizens are impotent in
the face of the current legal system, which apparently assures the
officials' impunity and places the citizens at risk of suffering repri-
sals if they seek to challenge this system.
82. See Klitgaard, supra note 2.
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Additionally, this social representation of corruption as being
institutionalized is consistent with the obvious economic features
of bribes. For the official, the cost of requesting or requiring a
bribe is extremely low, while at the same time the cost for the
lawyer of refusing to pay such a bribe is very high. Therefore, in
order to break this vicious cycle of corruption, the Mexican politi-
cal and legal systems must find ways to substantially raise the
stakes for those public officials who wish to initiate or participate
in corrupt acts. The suggestions laid out in this article can aid in
this process."
83. See supra Part V.
